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CASENOTES
BLUE SKY LAW-NEW YORK BLUE SKY LAW ANTIFRAUD
PROVISION USED TO IMPOSE CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON ATTORNEY WHO ENGAGED IN INSIDER TRADING. People v.
Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982).
Defendant, an attorney in a New York law firm that specialized in
corporate takeovers and mergers, acquired confidential information regarding planned takeover attempts and merger transactions by his
firm's corporate clients. 1 Without disclosing this information, he
purchased on the open market shares of both the firm's clients and the
takeover target corporations. 2 When news of the impending corporate
transactions was made public, defendant liquidated his shares at a considerable profit. 3 The attorney was prosecuted for insider trading and
for trading on material nonpublic information under section 352-c of
the New York blue sky law (Martin Act).4 On defendant's motion to
dismiss the misdemeanor information, the New York City Criminal
Court held that section 352-c was applicable to insider trading when
the transactions were made on a national stock exchange. 5
l. People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 693, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (N.Y. Crim.

Ct. 1982).
2.Id
3.Id
4. The statute provides in pertinent part:
l. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or any agent or employee
thereof, to use or employ any of the following acts or practices:
(a) Any fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false pretense or fictitious or pretended purchase or sale;
where engaged in to induce or promote the issuance, distribution,
exchange, sale, negotiation or purchase within or from this state of
any securities.
2. It shall be illegal and prohibited for any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or any agent or employee
thereof, to engage in any artifice, agreement, device or scheme to
obtain money, profit or property by any of the means prohibited by
this section.
3. A person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association, or
any agent or employee thereof, using or employing any act or practice declared to be illegal and prohibited by this section shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-c (McKinney 1968).
5. People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 693, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1982). An insider is a corporation director, officer, majority stockholder, or
one who by virtue of his relationship stands in a similar position. Wang, Trading
on Material Nonpublic In/ormation on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed,
and Who Can Sue Under s.E.c. Rule lOb-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1219 n.2,
1286 n.270 (1981). Insider trading is trading by an insider with shareholders of
the corporation using any material nonpublic information originating from the
issuing corporation and regarding its profits or the market for its securities. Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
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Since its enactment in 1921, New York courts have broadly construed the Martin Act, 6 using as their lodestar the language of Judge
Pound in People v. Federated Radio Corp. 7 Section 352-c8 was added to
the Martin Act in 1955 9 with the express purpose of providing "a deterrent to fraud where no adequate deterrent exists."10 Its addition was
intended to broaden the scope of the Martin Act to include a wider
range of deceptive or misleading acts, omissions, and practices that
were prevalent in the securities industry. II The amendment of section
352-c to the Martin Act represented a legislative attempt to harmonize
the New York statute with what were then viewed as the more liberal
federal antifraud provisions. 12
The extensive judicial treatment 13 of federal rule lOb-5 14 reflects
6. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-359 (McKinney 1968). For a discussion of the Martin Act, see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 35-42, 1440 (2d ed. 1961).
7. 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926). As Judge Pound explained in Federated Radio:
In a broad sense, the term [fraud) includes all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty.
The purpose of the law is to prevent all kinds of fraud in connection
with the sale of securities and commodities and to defeat all unsubstantial and visionary schemes in relation thereto whereby the public is
fraudently exploited. The terms 'fraud' and 'fraudulent-practice', in this
connection, should be given a wide meaning so as to include all acts,
although not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate fraud or injury upon others, which do by their tendency to
deceive or mislead the purchasing public come within the purpose of the
law.
Id at 35, 154 N.E. at 657 (citations omitted); see People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.,
83 Misc. 2d 210, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377
N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975); People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, Inc., 69 Misc. 2d 417, 330
N.Y.S.2d 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972); L. Loss, supra note 6, at 40-41 n.78.
8. See supra note 4.
9. 1955 N.Y. LAWS 553.
10. Memorandum of New York Attorney General Jacob Javits in Support of Chapter
553 of the Laws of 1955, reprinted in 1955 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 135 [hereinafter cited
as Attorney General's Memorandum).
11. Id
12. Id
13. E.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Ward LaFrance Truck Co., 13 S.E.C. 373
(1943).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1980), was issued under § 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976». Rule IOb-5 provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1980).
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the courts' recognition of a need for broader interpretation and flexible
application of antifraud provisions. From its inception in 1942, Rule
lOb-5 virtually preempted, albeit unintentionally, state and common
law remedies for securities fraud. IS According great deference l6 to what
they perceived to be the congressional intent in drafting federal securities legislation,17 courts gave Rule lOb-5 an almost uniformly broad
reading, most notably in the area of insider trading. 18 The duty to disclose inside information about a corporation or to abstain from trading
with that corporation's shareholders was initially founded on the existence of a special relationship with the corporation that allowed access
to this information. 19 The scope of this duty, however, was soon expanded to require disclosure to the general public20 based on the mere
possession of the inside information. 21 These and other decisions 22
clearly reflect judicial concern over the inequity inherent in the exploitation of an informational advantage gained by virtue of one's rela15. See Langvoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post- Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1982); Comment, Action Under State Law: Florida's Blue Sky and Common Law Alternatives to Rule lOb-5 for Relie.fin Securities
Fraud, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 636, 636-39 (1981); if. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24

16.
17.

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.

N.Y.2d 494, 502-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 83-84 (1969) (although impact of federal securities regulation has been great, that law was not
intended to limit state power to fashion its own remedies for securities violations).
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773, 775-76 (1979); Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-54 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13 (1934) and S. REp. No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 9 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §§ 17-18
(1973); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 322-23.
See Superintendent of Ins. V. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC V. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Coates V. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Speed V. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C.
633 (1971); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Ward LaFrance
Truck Co., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Pitt, After the Fall' The Ins and Outs ofRule lOb5, 12 AM. INST. SEC. REG. (P.L.I.) 603 (1980).
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
These three groups [officers, directors, and controlling stockholders],
however, do not exhaust the classes of persons upon whom there is such
an obligation. Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
Id at 912 (footnote omitted).
Shapiro V. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir.
1974).
SEC V. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Coates V. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See Pitt, supra note 18, at 641-49 (listing of cases).
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tionship with a corporation. 23
This historically broad, flexible application of Rule lOb-5 sharply
contrasts with its current interpretation. In Chiarella v. United States, 24
the Supreme Court severely limited a trader's duty to disclose or abstain from trading by holding that the duty rests on the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between the parties to the securities transaction.
Absent this relationship there is no duty, and failure to disclose material nonpublic information is not fraud under Rule lOb-5. 2s Thus, disclosure was not required of one not a classic insider, who was in
possession of material nonpublic information, and who would trade
with shareholders of the information source. Subsequently, in United
States v. Newman,26 the government advanced an alternative theory of
insider liability, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the breach of a fiduciary relationship with one not a
party to the securities transaction is a sufficient fraud or deception to
invoke criminal liability under Rule lOb_5. 27 While Newman does not
represent a wholesale return to the broad pre-Chiarella duty formulations,28 the decision does operate to expand the disclosure limitation
23. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247-48 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 345-46 (1979).
24. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
25. Id at 232-33; see also Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3262 n.15 (1983) ("[The)
mere possession of non-public information does not give rise to a duty to disclose
or abstain; only a specific relationship does that."); General Time Corp. v. Talley
Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968) (purchaser of securities, who was not an
insider of issuer, and who had no fiduciary relation to prospective seller, had no
duty to disclose circumstances that might raise the seller's demands); Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (breach of fiduciary duty to one's employer in it Rule IOb-5 civil action cannot be extended to
target corporation shareholders so as to give rise to a duty to disclose). Although
characterizing the Cady, Roberts duty to disclose as seminal, the Court, in both
Chiarella and Dirks, neglected to note that the Cady, Roberts opinion went on to
state that any limitation on the duty to disclose premised on the lack of a fiduciary
relationship between the parties to the transaction would be contrary to the broad
purpose of the federal securities acts. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,
913-14 (1961); accord In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.c. 633, 644 (1971);
Brudney, supra note 23, at 354; Pitt, supra note 18, at 641-42.
26.664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
27. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16. Defendants' criminal convictions were based on the
theory that the misappropriation of confidential corporate information from one's
employer for personal benefit is sufficient fraud or deception for Rule IOb-5 liability to attach to a securities transaction between parties (brokers and target shareholders) otherwise dealing at arm's length. Id at 17. Although it would reach the
same result as Newman, the misappropriation theory of Chief Justice Burger uses
the trader's misappropriation of inside information for personal benefit, which in
many cases will also result in the breach of any fiduciary relationship between the
trader and the information source, to create an absolute duty on the part of the
trader to disclose the information to target shareholders or abstain from trading.
Failure to disclose constitutes fraud or deception under Rule IOb-5. Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240-42 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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imposed by Chiarella. 29
In Florentino, the defendant drew on the differences between New
York's section 352-c and Rule lOb-5 in challenging the applicability of
section 352-c to his case. He contended30 that because he had no fiduciary relationship with any of the parties to the transaction, he had no
duty to disclose his inside information and therefore committed no
fraud by failing to do SO.31 The court found a fiduciary relationship
giving rise to a duty to disclose between the attorney and shareholders
of the firm's corporate clients by virtue of his representation of those
corporations. 32 By trading with these shareholders without disclosure,
defendant thus committed fraud under section 352-c. 33 In strong dic29. Newman may still represent a viable formula for expanding the Chiarella duty
limitation in criminal cases. See Proofreader Liable for Insider Trading, Judge
Orders Disgorgement of Profits, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at 2231 (Dec.
9, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Proofreader Liable]; High Court Lets Stand Newman
Insider Conviction, Three Other Securities Cases, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
39, at 1870 (Oct. 7, 1983); Dirks Enhanced SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading,
Goelzer Says, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 37, at 1820-21 (Sept. 30, 1983).
30. Defendant also argued that § 352-c was not intended to apply to insider trading
absent privity between buyer and seller. To so apply the provision for the first
time to his case, the defendant contended, constituted unfair surprise, and that
because this interpretation of § 352-c was not apparent on its face, the provision
was void as unconstitutionally vague. People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 693,
456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640, 642 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). He contended that a 1955
memorandum by then Attorney General Jacob Javits in support of the addition of
§ 352-c to the Martin Act evidenced a legislative intent that § 352-c apply not to
stock exchange transactions, but only to "the retail distribution of speculative securities-those situations in which the defrauded victim would be in privity with
the wrongdoer." Reply Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendant Florentino's Motion to Dismiss the Misdemeanor Information at 3, 5, People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982). Because the
Attorney General's memorandum, which was drafted by the amendment's sponsor, was the only source of legislative history for § 352-c, it was dispositive on the
issue of a privity requirement for the provision. Id. Judge Crane refuted this
contention by holding that although the historical development of the Martin Act
might suggest a privity limitation in § 352-c, because the New York legislature
failed to state clearly such a limitation and because this was a criminal, rather
than civil, action, any privity requirement was negated. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d
at 701-02, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 645-46. The Florentino court also rejected the defendant's vagueness and unfair surprise arguments, stating that the concept of fraud
embodied in § 352-c "has been applied to insider trading for longer than defendant has been a member of the bar." Id. at 695-96, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 641. Judge
Crane found it unlikely that defendant, a securities expert, was unfairly surprised
to learn that his conduct, clearly a violation of federal antifraud provisions, was
also a violation of a state provision that was amended in 1955 to harmonize the
New York and federal securities laws. Id. at 697, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
31. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d at 702, 456 N. Y .S.2d at 646.
32.Id.
33. Id. This holding is consistent with the common law rule that prohibits a corporate insider or one in a similar position from using confidential corporate information for personal benefit. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,248 N.E.2d 910,
301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). It also follows the traditional Rule lOb-5 principle that a
corporate director, officer, majority stockholder, or one in a similar position must
disclose any material nonpublic information about the corporation when trading
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tum, the court stated that while no fiduciary relationship giving rise to a
duty to disclose may have existed between the attorney and target
shareholders, he still may have violated section 352-c: the breach of a
fiduciary relationship between defendant and his firm and clients resulting from defendant's misuse of confidential corporate information
would constitute fraud in connection with the securities transaction between the attorney and target shareholders.34 The Florentino court apparently would incorporate the breach of any existing fiduciary
obligation in connection with a securities transaction as the element of
fraud or deception in a section 352-c criminal proceeding.35
The continued availability of the Newman theory of Rule lOb-5
criminalliability36 has alleviated the disparity between section 352-c
and Rule lOb-5 caused by the narrow Chiarella formulation of the duty
to disclose?7 Should other federal courts of appeal elect to ignore Newman in favor of the more forceful Chiarella rule, the reach of a section
352-c-type provision would become significantly broader than that of
Rule lOb-5 under the same circumstances. Under Chiarella, because
no fiduciary relationship existed between the attorney and target shareholders, the attorney had no duty to disclose his inside information and
thus committed no fraud by failing to do so before trading. 38 Under
section 352-c, however, the breach of a fiduciary obligation owed by an
attorney to his firm and clients, occasioned by his misappropriation of
confidential corporate information, constitutes a fraud or deception

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

with its shareholders or abstain if the information cannot be disclosed. See
Langevoort, supra note IS, at 4-11; Pitt, supra note 18, at 646-50; supra notes 1819.
People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 703, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 646-47 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1982). That neither the firm nor its corporate clients would have standing to
sue the attorney in a § 352-c (or Rule IOb-5) civil action for any breach of fiduciary duty to them does not preclude the use of this breach to find fraud or deception in a criminal action, where the antifraud provision is being used to protect the
general investing public. Id; United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 143 (1983); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff in a Rule IOb-5 civil action must be seller or
purchaser of the securities involved).
People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 703,456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 647 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1982).
See supra note 27. It is surprising that in light of Supreme Court decisions such as
Chiarella, Dirks, and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which
reflect a certain hostility to "novel" or broader, more flexible interpretations and
applications of Rule IOb-5, the Court let pass an opportunity to further cement the
Chiarella rule in denying the writ of certiorari in Newman. See Pitt, supra note
18, at 640-41.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see Poser, Misuse of Confidential
Information Concerning a Tender Offer as a Securities Fraud, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 1265, 1275 (1983).
While perhaps reprehensible, the mere breach of some fiduciary duty to one's firm
and its clients is not always fraud. Rule IOb-5 is not designed to detect every
breach of fiduciary duty that may occur in connection with a securities transaction. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977)).
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that taints the entire transaction, regardless of whether the attorney and
the target corporation shareholders were dealing at arm's length.3 9
A state blue sky provision such as section 352-c may represent a
viable alternative to Rule lOb-5 in an action for trading on material
non public information. Florentino illustrates a judicial willingness to
treat any fiduciary breach occurring in relation to a securities transaction as sufficient to meet a broadly defined fraud/deception element.
This approach significantly reduces the target shareholders' or the
state's burden because the breach of a fiduciary relationship is concurrent with the misappropriation of material nonpublic information from
an employer or client. Therefore, proof of the misappropriation constitutes proof of the breach. 40 The burden is further alleviated because
section 352-c does not require proof of scienter, which may be difficult
where the transactions occurred on a "faceless" national stock exchange. 41 As a note of caution, however, a party contemplating the use
of a state antifraud provision should carefully discern which elements
are re~uired; not all state statutes are uniformly less stringent than Rule
IOb-5. 2
Of the countless post-Chiarella criminal, civil, and SEC insider
39. People v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 710, 456 N.Y.S.2d 638,646-47 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1982); accord United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 143 (1983).
40. The receipt of confidential information in the course of one's employment imposes a duty not to use that information for personal benefit. Brophy v. Cities
Servo Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494,248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). The SEC has used a 1983 Supreme
Court decision to obtain a similar result: a stranger to a corporation can become a
"temporary insider" of that corporation, complete with fiduciary duties to its
shareholders, upon receipt of inside information originating from that corporation, and he will be precluded from trading in that corporation's stock without
disclosure. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983); see SEC Wins "Outsider Trading" Case: Tippee Deemed Temporary Insider, SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 37, at 1818 (Sept. 30, 1983) (discussing SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp.
1397 (1983».
41. Scienter, or intent to defraud, is a requisite element in criminal, civil, and SEC
actions under Rule IOb-5. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-91 (1980); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-202,212-13 (1976). Defendant, in Florentino, contended that § 352-c should also contain this scienter requirement. People
v. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d 692, 699-700,456 N.Y.S.2d 638, 644-45 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1982). Since the information in the pleadings sufficiently alleged scienter, the
Florentino court refused to consider whether a scienter requirement was constitutionally mandated, noting that the standard as developed in prior § 352-c cases is
proof only of intentional or knowing conduct. Id at 700-01, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 645;
see People v Barysh, 95 Misc. 2d 616, 618, 408 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193 (1978). In addition, the Florentino court rejected a privity requirement (implicit in the Chiarella
holding because of the fiduciary relationship requirement, Pitt, supra note 18, at
643), for § 352-c based on its legislative history, and because in a criminal action,
the objective of the Martin Act is to punish fraud perpetrated on the general public rather than to vindicate the rights of an individual investor, which would be
the purpose of a civil action for securities fraud. Florentino, 116 Misc. 2d at 70102,456 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45.
42. Comment, supra note 15, at 637-38, 649-51; MICHIGAN SECURITIES REGULATION
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trading and trading on material nonpublic information actions under
Rule lOb-S,43 many have seemingly inconsistent results, leading to the
conclusion that Rule lOb-S is in a state of confusion. Part of this confusion indubitably stems from the ingenuity of those seeking to circumvent its reach. Attempts, however, to close legislatively loopholes in
Rule IOb-S seem ill-advised. 44 Legislation proscribing specific acts as
fraudulent may have the effect of limiting the scope of Rule lOb-S, the
argument being that since a particular act or practice is not specifically
proscribed by the statute, the act or practice is not fraudulent. 45
Equally as compelling a reason for less Rule lOb-S legislation is the
existence of a perfectly serviceable state antifraud provision such as
section 3S2-c which, with perhaps some judicial testing, may provide a
broader remedy for inside trading than Rule lOb-S in its current guise.
Ralph V. Partlow III

§§ 9.09 E-F, 10.03 C (Moscow & Makens eds. 1983); if. L. Loss, supra note 6, at
31 nAO. The general antifraud provision of Maryland's blue sky laws provides:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) Employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) Engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person.
MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-301 (1975). Section 11-102 expressly
states that the terms "fraud," "deceit," and "defraud," as used in Title 11 of the
Code are not limited to common law deceit. The element of scienter has apparently been read out of § 11-301 and § 11-703, which set out civil penalties for
securities fraud. O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1124 (1981). For a general discussion of Maryland law, see Brune, Rule
lOb-5 and the General Law as to Deceit in Securities Transactions in Maryland, 33
MD. L. REV. 129, 135-38 (1973).
43. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983); United States v. Newman, 664
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983); SEC v. Lund, 570 F.
Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Proofreader Liable, supra note 29; Post-Dirks Insider Trading
Issues Debated At Conference, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 44, at 2070 (Nov.
11, 1983).
44. But if. Block & Barton, Securities Litigation, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 350 (1983) (advocating harsher, more detailed IOb-5 legislation to close gaps in the Rule created by
Chiarella, Dirks, and other decisions); Block & Huff, Life After Dirks: Can Outsider Trading Constitute Fraud?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1982, at 22, col. 4 (same).
45. "As the maxim [expresslO unius est exc/usio altenus] is applied to statutory interpretation, where a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation,
and the persons and things to which it refers are designated, there is an inference
that all omissions should be understood as exclusions." 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (C. Sand 4th ed. 1973) (footnotes omitted).

